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ABSTRACT 
In this chapter, the authors consider some of the issues regarding the rational choice decision framework 
in neoclassical economics and how it can particularly be found wanting in the absence of due consid-
eration for some of the underlying critical neurobiological factors which govern decision making. They 
develop a critical decision problem and explore the scenario where the solution predicted by formal 
economic theory may be in conflict with the decision that actually occurs. Such conflict is especially 
relevant in the context of economic decision making in emerging markets where there can be a lack of 
trust in the system by the agents operating within it. Based on logically consistent arguments derived 
from the extant literature, the authors argue that non-consideration of underlying neurobiological fac-
tors is a direct cause of this conflict. 
INTRODUCTION 
Economics is ultimately a decision science. 
However, "decision making" implies a broader 
bio-behavioural process encompassing passive 
as well as active functions bearing a range of 
cognitive complexity. When it comes to model-
ling the decision-making process, the approaches 
taken by neoclassical economists often completely 
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4745-9.ch004 
ignore the biological basis underlying what can 
superficially appear as a mechanistic process 
which may be effectively 'de-linked' from the 
subliminal bio-behavioural factors. 
'Rational choice' has formed the bedrock 
of neoclassical economic decision models for a 
substantial length of time. Although it somewhat 
fell out of favour for a while following the birth 
of the 'behavioural school', it has subsequently 
experienced a revival of sorts (Green & Shapiro, 
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1996). Under the quintessential neoclassical 
economic decision model, an individual decision 
maker is an inexorable 'utility maximizer'. She 
is faced with a number of alternative courses of 
action which may be ranked in the order of her 
preferences. There is an inherent logic in such 
preference ordering such that if an alternative is 
preferred over another, then a third alternative 
which is preferred over the former will also be 
preferred over the latter so that any such rank-
ing is objective, complete and transitive and in 
accordance with 'revealed preferences' (Kreps, 
1990). Any preference ranking which has the 
properties of completeness and transitivity may 
be mathematically represented via a 'utility func-
tion' so long as the number of alternative choices 
is finite (Mas-Collel, Whinston, & Green, 1995). 
Plotted graphically, such functions yield 'utility 
curves' that tend to have positives slopes at least 
up to a certain point. However, a utility curve 
typically starts dipping down after a certain point, 
reflecting the property of 'diminishing marginal 
utility' embedded within the governing utility 
function. In the presence of explicit restrictions 
under which a certain level of utility may be 
attained by the decision maker (e.g., budgetary 
limitations), a neoclassical economic decision 
problem is mostly seen to devolve to a constrained 
optimization problem, either deterministic or 
probabilistic (Alas et al, 2012). 
The modelling of an economic decision prob-
lem as a mathematical optimization problem al-
lows an objective treatment of the problem using 
well-established mathematical rules. However, 
the obtained result may then be seen to carry 'a 
stamp of infallibility' owing to it being derived via 
mathematical reasoning. While pure mathematical 
models have the obvious advantage of standing on 
and drawing from an established body oflogically 
consistent principles, they are at best inadequate 
and at worst inappropriate in modelling decision 
making as a human act. The problem of over-
reliance on optimality models to suit biological 
problems has been well-addressed by Rice (2012). 
To the extent that human decision making entails 
a distinctive bio-behavioural process which is 
contingent on the level of cognitive complexity 
needed by a specific decision problem, an absolute 
reliance on mathematical optimization methods is 
not recommended. Indeed, as Sas sower (2010) has 
argued, instead of trying to continuously re-invent 
neoclassical economics with the objective of "force 
fitting" its constructs to the problem domains that 
essentially lie outside its scope, one may do better 
to be "flexible" with the constructs themselves. 
Only in the last 30 years has the role of "ir-
rationality" in human decision-making received 
attention due to the ground-breaking work of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in which they 
postulated their prospect theory as a formal depar-
ture from the expected utility theoretic paradigm 
of rational choice. A few years later, Hershey, 
Kunreuther and Schoemaker (1982) observed 
that a choice between the same pair of certain and 
risky results was largely determined by whether 
the decision was represented as a "gamble" when 
the individuals displayed risk-seeking behaviour, 
or as an "insurance" when they suddenly became 
risk averse. 
The next two decades were clearly dominated 
by the behaviourists and behavioural economics 
gained a strong foothold within the academic 
ramparts as a sub-field of both economic as well 
as the behavioural sciences. Although Schultz 
(2008) has criticized prospect theory by claiming 
that it lacks a coherent framework, Kahneman 
and Tversky's work has to be credited with hav-
ing opened the proverbial "Pandora's Box" by 
firmly establishing behavioural economics as a 
recognized discipline. Loewenstein, Rick and 
Cohen (2008) have argued that human beings are 
inherently "fallible creatures" and not the perfect 
maximizers of utility as assumed by the neoclas-
sical utility theory. Therefore, any such study of 
economic decision-making as a subset of overall 
human behaviour should borrow extensively from 
the discipline of psychology which recognizes 
and explores human fallibility. 
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Today, economists generally agree a strong as-
sumption of rationality and exclusive dependence 
on mathematical modelling is perhaps not the 
best approach to study human decision making 
(Camerer, 2007). However, between economics 
and biology there is currently very little overlap 
of methodological approaches to engender any 
effective interdisciplinary modelling. Therefore, 
while the challenge for economics is not only 
concerned with 'denying' the role of biology in 
better understanding decision making in general 
and economic decision making in particular, it is 
also concerned with being more 'accepting' of 
alternative methodological approaches within its 
mainstream literature. However, some common 
ground is being developed as economists have 
already adopted a number of experimental ap-
proaches recently primarily from the behavioural 
sciences. These economists are also employing 
experimental methods from the biological sci-
ences as evidenced by the burgeoning growth of 
the sub-discipline of 'experimental economics' 
(Alas et al, 2012). 
However, to the extent that experimental eco-
nomics has been applied to the study of decision 
making, it has tended to be overly concerned 
with primary data gathering rather than to the 
development of alternative models of decision 
making behaviour which accommodates criti-
cal biological factors. Even as a data gathering 
exercise, experimental economics is criticized 
on the grounds it is almost impossible to "keep 
everything else the same" while varying only the 
factors of interest when conducting an economic 
experiment. Often only anecdotal observations 
about the subject's intended behaviour can be made 
(Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2004). While 
data gathering via controlled experimentation is 
a positive addition to the economist's repertoire 
of methodological approaches, a better incorpora-
tion of the established biological factors underly-
ing decision making within the decision theory 
models as advocated by economists is required. 
This does not automatically imply a dilution of 
pure economic theory. 
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In the following sections, we will closely ex-
amine a relatively simple decision theoretic model 
as advocated by neoclassical economics. We will 
subsequently review the relevant biological factors 
that need to be incorporated within the economic 
model to provide a better representation of reality 
that may not be achieved by a formal economic 
model, which; although mathematically elegant; 
can be ultimately pointless. 
DECISION MAKING IN 
CRITICAL SITUATIONS: AN 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
Economists have always been infatuated with the 
study of complex human behaviour. However, they 
have traditionally attempted to exclude the 'human' 
component, thus reducing the problem to a purely 
mechanistic one amenable to rigorous mathemati-
cal analyses which lead to elegant solutions. One 
of the formal economic models of studying com-
plex behaviour is the coordination game such as 
the battle of the sexes. For sake of simplicity, we 
consider only two players (i.e., decision makers) in 
which both can obtain the best possible outcome 
through effective coordination. One of the distinc-
tive characteristics of complex decision situations 
modelled as coordination games is the existence 
of multiple equilibriums (i.e., there exists more 
than one solution with positive outcomes for play-
ers). However, these outcomes are not necessarily 
obtained in a Pareto-ranked manner; therefore, 
the primary challenge becomes that of selecting 
the best out of several possible outcomes. Among 
the formal methods advocated by economists for 
solving such decision problems, the most well-
known is the one originally proposed by Harsanyi 
and Selten (1988). However, a second approach 
was subsequently proposed by Kandori, Mailath 
and Rob (1993) which is based on the principle 
of natural selection borrowed from evolutionary 
biology and considers each individual player's 
learning behaviour. 1 It is perhaps also worth 
mentioning here that game theory purely as a 
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mathematical tool has been applied in evolutionary 
biology following the pioneering works of John 
Maynard Smith (1973, 1982). But, here we are 
interested in its application in decision making to 
understand how an improvement can be effected 
by considering inputs from the biological basis of 
behaviour-not vice versa. The particular decision 
problem considered here is a slightly extended 
version of the one originally posed by Martins et 
al (2012) which is stated as follows: 
Two men are out walking in a forest when they 
chance upon an angry bear at the same time. The 
bear charges at them. It is 'common knowledge' 
to both of them that they cannot outrun a charging 
bear and the best approach would be to lie face 
down and try to remain absolutely still i.e. adopt 
a 'play dead' strategy to have maximum chance of 
survival. If they were to try and run away from the 
bear (hereafter we refer this strategy 'run away'), 
it would catch up first with the slower of the two 
so that the faster man would most likely have time 
to escape. However, the escapee has to get out of 
the forest alone which is also dangerous as there 
may be other dangers which two men are better 
off facing together than alone. What strategy will 
each adopt to maximize his chances of getting out 
of the situation unhurt? 
Let us place values of "-1" for the worst-case 
scenario (i.e., getting mauled) and "+ l" for the 
best case scenario (i.e., escaping unhurt) for each 
of the two men. Furthermore, if one of them man-
ages to escape from the charging bear, his pay-off 
is 'O' as he must still survive alone in the forest. 
If both of them choose 'run away' as the strategy, 
then the pay off for each of them will be ( 112) 
( 1)+(112)(-1) = 0, as the slower of the two will 
get mauled. Here, due to lack of better informa-
tion, one assumes that the probability of the first 
person (say Player A) of outrunning the second 
person (say Player B) is p = 1/2 and the probability 
of Player B outrunning Player A is q = 1 - p = 
1 - 1/2 = 112 as well. The overall payoff matrix 
for this coordination game is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Payoff matrix/or a 2-person coordination 
game "Survive the charge by a bear" 
Player B 
Play dead Runaway 
Player 
A Play dead (I, I) (0, -1) 
Runaway (-1, 0) (0, 0) 
For the game with the above pay-off matrix, 
there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria which 
are as follows: 
(i) {play dead, play dead}; and 
(ii) {run away, run away} 
When solved applying standard game theory 
principles, the above problem will have an equi-
librium solution for the 'play dead' strategy with 
the maximum (1, 1) payoff for the two players. 
However, this equilibrium solution will not be 
'unique' - for example, adopting a 'run away' 
strategy will also yield an equilibrium solution. 
However, the 'play dead' strategy will still be the 
Pareto-dominant strategy that will maximize the 
individual payoffs for both players. 
The critical question to ponder in a real 'life-
or-death' situation such as the one above is: "How 
likely is the dominant strategy as identified by 
economic theory to be chosen over the other two 
lower ranked strategies"? This is where we posit 
that economics will do well to borrow from the 
biological basis of behaviour. In the next sec-
tion, we explore the biological factors that, if 
considered, will 'complete' this model and allow 
for some plausible explanations for the scenario 
where the Pareto-dominant strategy may not actu-
ally be the one selected by the decision maker in 
real life scenarios. 
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WHAT ECONOMISTS SHOULD 
LEARN FROM NEUROBIOLOGISTS 
ABOUT HUMAN DECISION MAKING 
Following Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), 
one could obviously resort to evolutionary dy-
namics to extrapolate the values of 'p' and 'q' 
in Table 1 based on adaptive learning behaviour. 
However, this still implicitly assumes that facing 
a 'life-or-death' situation, individuals could (or 
would) inexorably seek a globally optimal solu-
tion. Identifying the best decision calculus to be 
applied to find the globally optimal solution (e.g., 
whether an evolutionary optimization model or 
a non-evolutionary optimization model would be 
more efficient). However, this becomes a moot 
point if the decision to be taken under a critical 
situation comes partly (or wholly) from a decision 
maker's cognitive control. 
It has been observed that certain human be-
haviours which appear to occur with the brain 
on 'auto pilot' are subsequently misinterpreted 
by human experimental subjects as having oc-
curred via a process of conscious deliberation 
(Wolford, Miller & Gazzaniga, 2000). Therefore, 
it is apparent that although a decision could arise 
purely out of a series of neural activities which are 
entirely inaccessible to the cognitive process, one 
can mistakenly attribute the same to a conscious 
decision making act. The question is basic: "If a 
decision is made with the brain on "auto pilot", 
then how can one develop a decision that maxi-
mizes some measure of expected utility within 
(or even without) a given set of constraints"? One 
would clearly need to first determine whether and 
to what extent a decision is under the decision 
maker's cognitive control before one can process 
it through any mathematical model with the aim 
of deriving a globally optimal solution (Alas et 
al, 2012). 
It is intuitively apparent from the payoff matrix 
depicted in Table 1 that - in the absence of fore-
knowledge about Player B's chosen action-Player 
A could very well decide to run as that would 
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maximize his own chance of escaping unhurt for 
all 'perceived' values of q > 1 - p (i.e. q > Y:z), 
therefore selecting anon Pareto-dominant strategy. 
This is due to the fact that the 'perceived' value 
is essentially a subjective probability value which 
is strongly dependent on analogical cues received 
via rapid processing of sensory information (e.g., 
if Player A is a heavier person than Player B, then 
the latter could 'upgrade' his subjective probability 
of being able to outrun the former and therefore 
actually have a 'perceived' value of q > Y2). 
If both players apply a rational, deliberative 
process, then they should heed their past knowl-
edge of a bear's behaviour and attempt to use that 
knowledge to maximize their collective chance of 
escaping unhurt. But when facing such a critical 
situation, human decisions are rarely judgmental 
and hardly pertain to a cognitive, deliberative 
process. It could of course be that the actual deci-
sion turns out to be the same as the one predicted 
by formal economic reasoning, but this will not 
necessarily always be the case. In fact, spontaneous 
decisions are processed when the brain is on "auto 
pilot" and is under little or no cognitive control of 
the decision maker. Therefore, in reality a globally 
optimal solution reached via rigorous economic 
modeling may be pointless. This is especially 
relevant in cases in which certain all-pervading 
assumptions are made concerning the context 
within which an economic decision is taken. 
These assumptions serve to uphold the es-
sential mathematical structure of the formal 
economic model, but at the expense of driving a 
wedge between the expected result between the 
formal model and the expected result from the 
neurobiological hard-wiring of the human brain. 
As stated previously, perhaps the most common 
(and also most commonly criticized) of all the as-
sumptions underlying economic decision models 
is the assumption of 'rationality' where the deci-
. sion maker is seen as an inexorable maximizer 
of her expected utility. However, even if we are 
to accept the basic assumption of rationality, 
neoclassical economists take a huge leap of faith 
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when the underlying probability distributions are 
also assumed to be either fully known a priori or 
to be completely derivable so that the expected 
utility function that is to be maximized is ac-
curately framed all the time. Given that while 
taking critical decisions within stiff time and 
resource constraints, human brains may revert to 
an "auto-pilot" mode which entirely by-passes a 
deliberative cognitive process, accurate framing 
of the objective expected utility function by the 
decision-maker that cannot be guaranteed. 
Kahneman (2002) posited a human brain makes 
a decision at two distinct levels which he catego-
rized according to 'processing speeds' for deci-
sions: one is fast and spontaneous working mainly 
via analogical reasoning, while the other is slower, 
deliberative, and searches for causative rather 
than merely analogical links. This dichotomous 
processing is what he said is at the root of human 
irrationality, since the 'fast brain' can sometimes 
create an illusory feeling of 'knowing what one is 
doing' which is then meekly corroborated by the 
'slow brain' without deep deliberation. The result 
is a feeling of overconfidence which could result 
in a decision which fails to acquire, acknowledge, 
and apply all such relevant facts and data that are 
not in line with the analogical reasoning originally 
produced by the 'fast brain'. 
Beyond Kahneman, one could then argue that 
the decision of the 'fast brain' is essentially the one 
that is placed in 'auto-pilot' mode even when the 
decision-maker may not be feeling overconfident 
simply because time and resource constraints may 
not permit the decision of the 'fast brain' to be 
ratified by the 'slow brain' in a critical situation 
(e.g., when being charged by an angry wild bear). 
However, it is in exploring 'underconfidence' as 
the converse of overconfidence that one can really 
appreciate the neurobiological underpinnings of 
human decision-making. Intuitive logic dictates 
people should feel less confident in making deci-
sions when they do not have access to all relevant 
facts and data. 
Moore and Cain (2007) have posited and 
demonstrated using a Bayesian framework that 
people tend to be 'underconfident' when facing 
tasks requiring a higher level of skills (e.g., a 
higher level of cognitive involvement) compared 
to tasks requiring a lower level of skills. This is 
somewhat counter-intuitive because with skill-
based tasks (i.e., tasks requiring higher cogni-
tive involvement), individuals actually possess 
better information (e.g., relevant facts and data) 
about themselves regarding their own ability to 
accomplish such tasks based on skill level and 
previous experience. The explanation lies in the 
neurobiological hard-wiring of the human deci-
sion process. 
Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2004) have 
contended most human decision-making consists 
of two components: 
1. Spontaneous: Roughly corresponding with 
Kahneman's 'fast brain'; and 
2. Judgmental: Roughly corresponding with 
Kahneman's 'slow brain') and involves a 
conscious, deliberative process. 
Such behavior is produced mainly by the co-
ordinated activities of the four lobes of the brain: 
frontal, parietal, occipital, and temporal. The 
frontal lobes play crucial role in making plans, 
exercising cognitive control and in establishing 
coordination among other lobes of the brain to 
produce a particular behaviour. The other three 
lobes, parietal, occipital and temporal, govern 
motor action, visual processing and emotion/ 
recognition/memory, respectively. 
These four lobes process and assimilate all 
available facts and data to make any type of 
decision. However, when faced with a critical 
situation in which a decision must be made very 
quickly, the inter-lobe coordination can become 
momentarily impaired. When forced to make a 
rapid decision, the brain will tend to "overwrite" 
past knowledge (Camerer, Lowenstein & Prelec, 
2004 ). Indeed, such "overwriting" is possibly the 
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key factor separating us from the mathematical 
predictions of the expected utility maximization 
models. We can also become underconfident 
about a decision even if we have access to all 
relevant facts and data in the event of coordina-
tion impairment between the lobes. Specifically, 
this feeling of underconfidence could arise from 
a momentary disconnect between the frontal and 
temporal lobes where the latter, as the seat of all 
emotions, "overwrites" some of the frontal lobe's 
cognitive processing. The most basic of all human 
emotions is self-preservation which can sometimes 
contrast with what is suggested by relevant facts 
and data. Therefore, even while all the relevant 
facts and data might suggest that the best way to 
escape a charging bear is to lie still and play dead, 
this may be "overwritten" by the more basic emo-
tive response of self-preservation of getting out 
of harm's way - a fact which actually makes the 
person feel "underconfident" about the prospect 
of escaping unhurt by playing dead and instead 
triggers an attempt to try and outrun the bear. 
In the following section, we will explore ex-
actly how neurobiological hardwiring can affect 
economic decision making when we consider 
an additional element - a lack of trust for the 
system within which the decision-making agent 
is operating. 
A NEUROBIOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE OF CRITICAL 
ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING 
IN EMERGING MARKETS 
Most neoclassical economic decision models 
explicitly or implicitly assume the decision-maker 
has complete trust in the system within which she 
is operating. In other words, the system provides 
a perfectly level playing field for all agents oper-
ating within its boundaries and this is 'common 
knowledge' to each and every agent. For example, 
a common assumption in financial economics is 
that of 'efficient markets' (i.e., where no indi-
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vidual agent enjoys any information advantage 
over another agent operating in that same market 
and all the agents know this as fact). Market ef-
ficiency has become a theoretical cornerstone in 
modern asset-pricing models, although whether 
or not financial markets are truly efficient is still 
debated-especially when extending their coverage 
to include those in emerging economies. 
Financial theorists have always struggled to 
adequately explain irrational behavior of masses 
(e.g., formation of sudden, rapid price bubbles), 
and usually dismiss them as aberrations and 
anomalies rather than as something systemic. 
However, the market movements are nothing but 
collective reflections of human decisions at an 
individual level, and therefore possess a funda-
mentally neurobiological origin. When faced with 
a critical situation, it is not only relevant facts and 
data which may be by-passed in decision-making 
- it is also the faith or trust that one has for the 
system within which the decision needs to be made 
and the results to be determined. Revisiting the 
"charging bear" illustration, if the two persons 
were actually very good friends or brothers, the 
decision each would have arrived at would possibly 
reflect a certain 'level of trust' that each has for 
the other; therefore, the outcome would possibly 
be different if they were total strangers. 
If a financial market is perfectly efficient, 
market players possess no advantage from "insider 
information". Therefore, as long as the players 
can trust the system they can execute their trades 
without fear of being "given a rough deal". How-
ever, this trust on the system takes time to develop. 
Just as it is not reasonable to expect the same level 
of mutual trust between two total strangers when 
facing a charging bear as we can between two 
brothers, we also cannot expect trust in the market 
system to spontaneously form in the minds of the 
people as soon as a formerly closed and strongly 
· monitored economy suddenly is made available 
to the forces of supply and demand. Many of the 
emerging economies of today, such as those found 
in the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) trading 
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bloc, are relatively new to the open market system. 
Understandably, serious trust issues exist regarding 
working within that new system (Flores Jr., 2011). 
Therefore, when faced with a critical invest-
ment decision under considerable resource con-
straints, it is very likely a common investor in an 
emerging market would tend to exhibit herding 
behaviour and "follow what others are doing" 
rather than attempt to use the relevant facts and 
data, especially if such facts and data conflict 
with the observations of others' overt behavior. 
An investor is very likely to lack confidence about 
the ability of the relevant facts and data to obtain a 
better return on investment primarily because the 
individual does not yet trust the system generating 
those facts and data. Her 'fast brain' would simply 
form an analogical link between "more people 
acting in a particular way" and "the best way to 
act under the given circumstances" and her 'slow 
brain' would meekly corroborate given a lack of 
trust in the market system that will take longer 
time to be reconciled. 
CONCLUSION: A MARRIAGE 
OF METHODOLOGIES IS 
URGENTLY REQUIRED 
It is quite apparent from our discussions in the 
previous sections that human decision making, if 
modeled as an inexorable search for global optimal-
ity purely by adhering to rigorous mathematical 
rules, will be incomplete in terms of offering a fair 
representation of reality. Mathematical elegance 
does not necessarily guarantee a fair representation 
of human behaviour-especially in the presence of 
trust issues. That economics models must perform 
better to provide a fair representation of reality 
is an acknowledged fact even among economists. 
When artificially intelligent decision sup-
port systems are designed with the objective of 
emulating complex decision making behaviour of 
humans, there is often an overt emphasis on better 
programming the 'softer' aspects of the algorithm 
that account for the 'human' factors (Bhattacha-
rya & Kumar, 2012). In fact, for an artificially 
intelligent decision support system the true test 
of 'intelligence' is its ability to incorporate and 
reflect the inescapable subjectivities associated 
with human behaviour - to go beyond the "how" 
and address the "why" underlying complex deci-
sion making (Bhattacharya, Wang & Xu, 2010). 
However, somewhat paradoxically, neoclassical 
economists make a conscious attempt to remove 
or ignore the quintessential 'human' factors when 
building a predictive model of human behavior. 
Arguably the most quintessential of all 'human' 
factors is the neurobiology of the human brain. 
It is understood that any modelling exercise in 
scientific discipline will face some inherent 'trade-
offs' as a result of "the logic of representation" 
(Weisberg, 2004). However, it is when a model-
ling exercise consciously avoids consideration 
of facts which are known to the theorists to be 
definitely relevant and probably critical that the 
modelling objectives substantiate a re-visit and 
perhaps a re-focus. 
Understanding human behaviour necessitates 
a deeper knowledge about the biological basis 
of a utility function (Cox, 2004). Robson (1996, 
2001a, 200lb) and Bhattacharya and Kumar 
(2007) have argued in favor of a fundamentally 
biological origin of utility functions that evolve 
into certain well-recognized forms - those which 
survive a process of natural selection and outlast 
others. Okasha (2007) proposed an evolutionary 
explanation for risk aversion behaviour that was 
missing in the 'rational choice' explanations 
which have always found it difficult to objectively 
explain risk aversion. 
Generally, economic models still appear to be 
deficient in terms of their incorporation of biologi-
cal facts. The most plausible reason for this is a 
methodological disconnect between economists 
and biologists. Of course, the central issue is the 
measurement of the variables of interest. Econo-
mists have always been obsessed with objective 
measurements, and it is only very recently with 
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significant advances in medical technology that 
direct observation and measurement of human 
brain activities in real time has become possible 
without taking recourse to any invasive approach. 
For example, neuro-imaging studies using 
real-time functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(tMRI) is rapidly becoming an acceptable meth-
odological approach in experimental economics 
(Sanfey et al., 2003; Cacioppo & Nusbaum, 2003; 
Khoshnevisan et al., 2008). The usual pattern of 
such experiments involves taking brain images in 
real time of the experimental subjects while they 
are engaged in some specific decision making task. 
The tMRI images can reveal the exact sections of 
the brain that are most active while performing 
the given decision tasks. From the data, it is pos-
sible to isolate the inherent factors and processes 
underlying the choice of a specific action from 
a set of alternatives in terms of both structural 
(i.e., neurobiological) as well as cognitive (i.e., 
behavioural) mechanisms (Alas et al, 2012). 
The application of neuroscience methods in 
the study of economic decision making is quite 
new, and as such there is some 'hype' associated 
with it as might be expected for a relatively new 
discipline (Maki, 2010). However, this does not 
diminish the fact that a marriage of methodologies 
of neurobiology and economics actually offers real 
hope to economists to be able to finally secure a 
biological ratification of their decision models. 
As we have argued, a mathematical decision 
model yielding a globally optimal solution is use-
less unless it can be applied specifically targeting 
that component of human economic decision mak-
ing involving a conscious, deliberative process and 
bypasses the spontaneous component-especially 
in decision-making situations in which there is a 
lack of trust in the overall economic system as 
is often the case with emerging markets. While 
neoclassical economic theory will still remain 
relevant, incorporation of the neurobiological 
factors in human decisions can only make micro-
economic modelling more meaningful. 
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
Common Knowledge: Common knowledge 
refers not only to mutual knowledge among play-
ers but also each individual knows that all other 
individuals know it, each individual knows that 
all other individuals know that all the individuals 
know it and so on. 
Coordination Game: Unlike in other games 
that require competitive strategizing, the outcome 
of a coordination game does not depend solely 
upon direct competition between the players but 
rather upon the confidence on and expectations 
from the players' coordinated strategies. 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(fMRI): A neuroimaging technology that uses 
signals picked up from changes in brain hemody-
namics (blood flows to various parts of the brain) 
in order to measure brain activity. 
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Nash Equilibrium: In game theory, a particu-
lar strategy profile qualifies as a Nash equilibrium 
if that strategy profile consists of each player's 
best response such that no player has an incentive 
to seek a different strategy profile. 
Pareto-Ranked Equilibria: Coordination 
games may exhibit multiple Pareto-ranked equilib-
ria i.e. one particular equilibrium is superior to all 
the other equilibria; as that particular equilibrium 
ensures the highest pay-off. 
Pareto Ranking: A ranking based on the 
Pareto criteria in which one particular parameter 
may be improved without adversely impacting on 
another parameter. 
Principle of Natural Selection: This term is 
mainly used in the Evolutionary Biology to refer 
to selection mechanism that favors some varieties 
over others. 
ENDNOTES 
Our objective here is not to attempt an 
extension to the literature on game theory 
as a mathematical tool but rather show, via 
logical arguments, how a particular decision 
making problem modelled using standard 
game theoretic methods cannot be consid-
ered 'complete' without considering all the 
underlying neurobiological factors. 
